Interpreting Hegel's "Lectures on Aesthetics"

Apollo Belvedere

Circa 120–140; copy of bronze original of ca. 350–325 BC.

Marble, 224 cm (88 in)

Vatican Museums

Over the course of his lectures, Hegel’s approach to the philosophy of art varied, so that in the materiel from 1818-20, for example, “the content and structure…[are both] closely connected to the systematic position allocated to art in the Encyclopedia of 1917…[there,] Hegel lectured on art and religion together, treating them separately for the first time in Berlin [1920-1]” (Gaiger, 2006:161).  Hotho had access to that material, as well as his own notes from 1823, 1826, and 1828-9, but the lecture notes are themselves all much shorter, more tentative, and more exploratory than Hotho’s volumes would indicate, suggesting again that Hegel was still working out his philosophical aesthetics when he died in 1831.  Therefore any accurate interpretation of Hotho’s volumes-or Knox’ translation of them-must include an interpretation of the difference between Hegel’s own lecture notes, the student transcripts that provided access to the last three courses, Hotho’s own way of integrating and handling these materials, and the development of Hegel’s philosophy of art as reflected during a particular lecture series.  The differences between the source materials and Hotho’s three volumes, then, pose the hermeneutic challenges of reinterpreting not only Hegel’s own philosophy of art, but also the distortions caused by the influence of those volumes (through Knox’ translation) on philosophical aesthetics in the English speaking world: “…according to one of the leading specialists on Hegel’s aesthetics, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Hotho distorted Hegel’s thought in various ways: he gave Hegel's account of art a much stricter systematic structure than Hegel himself had given it, and he supplemented Hegel's account with material of his own (PKÄ, xiii–xv).

Interpreting and Misinterpreting Hegel's "Aesthetics"

Jackson Pollock Number 8 (1949)

Oil, enamel, and aluminum paint on canvas (86.6 x 180.9 cm.)

Neuberger Museum, State University of New York

It should be well noted at the outset that the interpretive problems associated with the Lectures are so extraordinarily complex that we simply cannot be sure about the precise relationship between the Knox translation and Hegel’s own thought.  Besides the difficulties common to any translation of a complex philosophical work, the text from which Knox worked consists of a heavily edited edition of Hegel’s lecture notes rather than a treatise, and therefore reflects the process of Hegel’s thought working itself out rather than a finished, polished facet of his system.  That in turn has been filtered through the perceptions and concerns of the note takers and the editor. “We know from Hegel’s correspondences that although he hoped to publish a work on the philosophy of art he “was” not yet ready to do so.  Gethmann-Siefert has urged that we should see his aesthetics as ‘a work in progress,’ subject to continual rewriting over the different lecture series” (Gaiger, 2006:162):

“Heinrich Gustav Hotho (1802–1873) published the three-volume Ästhetik (1835) four years after the death of Hegel. From archive research it has become clear that in the ‘compilation’ of his Hegelian Ästhetik Hotho employed mainly his own lectures of 1823. This has  led to the view that Hothos’s 1823 lectures taken all together actually constitute Hegelian aesthetics. [Weiss’] article seeks to challenge this notion. Hegel gave four series of lectures on aesthetics in Berlin in 1820/21, 1823, 1826, and 1828/29. Since he never wrote his own work on aesthetics, one might consider the edition of four series of lectures to be the ‘real’ Hegelian Ästhetik.”[1]

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[1]. János Weiss, “Auf den Spuren der richtigen Hegelschen Ästhetik” (abstract) from Knihovna Akademie věd Česká republika http://dlib.lib.cas.cz/2745/ (accessed 10/15/08)

Duchamp After Hegel: Preparatory Remarks

Hannah Höch, Cut with the Kitchen Knife through the Beer-Belly of the Weimar Republic (1919)

Collage of pasted papers, 90 x 144 cm

Staatliche Museen zu Berlin

Our larger argument that Duchamp exemplifies Hegel’s theory of art’s dissolution must be framed by some preparatory remarks about the special challenges to interpretation presented by the Lectures on Fine Art.  For one thing, the Knox translation of Hegel’s notes requires special hermeneutic caution, not least because the text consists of edited lectures and is therefore filtered through the perceptions and concerns of the note takers and the editor.  The key interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of art within the English-speaking world, then, bears a particularly complex and vexing relationship to the thought of Hegel.  We must also explain the importance of referring to the dissolution of art rather than the “end of art,” a simple but vital correction to the numerous misinterpretations of the Lectures that circulate throughout the secondary literature.  Finally, in preparation for the main argument, we will develop a way of reading Hegel’s philosophy of art within the context of his whole system.  All of this is necessary in order to revise the way that the “end of art” thesis is currently located within Lectures on Fine Art.

Roman Satire, Romantic Irony, Duchamp's Dada: Dialectic in Hegel's Art History

Marcel Duchamp, “Tu m’” (1918)

Oil on canvas, with bottle brush, three safety pins, and one bolt  (69.8 x 303 cm)

Yale University Art Gallery

Our explication of Hegel’s Lectures will first address the dissolution of art through Hegel’s conceptions of Roman satire and Romantic irony. Next Roman satire and Romantic irony will be viewed through Hegel’s conception of the relationships between art and religion, systematically connecting art’s dissolution to the roles of Roman and Christian religion in the development of Spirit. Finally, I’ll argue that we can, via Roman satire and Romantic irony, apply the theme of art’s dissolution to the work of Marcel Duchamp, which enables us to produce a truly Hegelian reading of Contemporary art. This step will involve a critique of the work of Arthur Danto and his interpretation of Duchamp and Warhol. The conclusion will argue that Duchamp’s work represents a synthesis of Roman satire and Romantic irony, thereby constituting yet another occurrence of art’s dissolution. In developing that argument I’ll offer some criticisms of contemporary art and art writing.

Satirical and Ironic Dissolutions of Art: Duchamp's Synthesis

Roy Lichtenstein, “Brushstroke” (1965)

Offset lithograph, 23" x 29" Tate Museum, London

From a Hegelian perspective, Duchamp’s place in the development of the contemporary involves a synthesis of the satiric and ironic modes of art’s previous moments of dissolution. A Hegelian understanding of satire and irony, which are the specific forms taken by the dissolution of Classical and Christian art, will allow us to grasp historically, as a replaying and a synthesis of art’s previous dissolutions, the meaning of the peculiar narcissism, hermeticism and emptiness that afflict the contemporary artworld. That reading reworks the theme of art’s dissolution into an analytic tool, and saves the concept of “the end of art” from being a mere slogan, one charged with nostalgia and despair, but of little value as a term of art-historical and aesthetic understanding.

Once we address art in terms a systematic reading of Hegel’s “Lectures,” we’ll finally be able to apply Hegel’s concept of art’s dissolution to the contemporary artworld by historically grasping the advent of Marcel Duchamp as a replaying of the moment of art’s dissolution. For better or worse, it is in large part Duchamp’s synthesis of the satirical and ironic dissolutions of art that define contemporary art. The revised Hegelian approach that emerges is not merely critical of the contemporary, however, but is also equipped to understand and appreciate it, prepared to retain its most valuable possibilities, and thereby able to remain hopeful about what lies beyond.

Duchamp and the Dissolution of Art

A firm grasp of what Hegel really meant by the dissolution of art would, in fact, be a very strong interpretive tool in the contemporary art world.  Of course, the test case for Hegel’s true relevance to contemporary art is the application of the Lectures on Aesthetics to Marcel Duchamp, because Duchamp is by common consent the ürsprung of the contemporary.[1]  In addition, Duchamp’s own aesthetics-or anti-aesthetics-intersects with Hegel’s in a way that reveals much about art’s dissolution.  Arguing strongly for the continuing relevance of the Lectures, Hegel’s philosophy of art illuminates Duchamp’s anti-art, and Duchamp’s work in turn illuminates Hegel’s aesthetics.  Duchamp’s interest in Pyrrhonian philosophy invites an investigation of skepticism as it appears in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, while the satirical aspects of Duchamp’s work recall Hegel’s treatment of Roman comedy.   Furthermore, Duchamp’s reading of Max Stirner’s The Ego and its Own allows us to develop a Hegelian criticism of Duchamp’s work from an ethical perspective, immediately recalling the philosopher’s trenchant criticism of irony during the Romantic period.

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[1]. For example, Kimball complains: “Almost everything championed as innovative in contemporary art is essentially a tired repetition of gestures inaugurated by the likes of Marcel Duchamp” (Kimball, 2008:27).  The conservative position in art writing, for lack of a better word, generally frowns on contemporary art as lacking in aesthetic, moral, and spiritual value, but agrees with advocates of the contemporary on the central importance of Duchamp; “the post-1945 artists of Pop Art, Happenings, Op Art, Fluxus, Conceptual Art…all felt that Duchamp belonged to them, that he was their ‘prototype.’” Rudolf E. Kuenzli’s introduction to Marcel Duchamp, Artist of the Century Eds. Kuenzli and Francis M. Naumann (Massachusetts; MIT, 1991) p. 1  Therefore Duchamp is blamed for contemporary artists who uncreatively follow in his footsteps, while the importance of Duchamp within in his own context is entirely missed.

Hegel's "End of Art:" Context and Interpretation

Jeff Koons, “Antiquity 3” (2011)

Oil on canvas, 259.1 x 350.5 cm

The main reason for the lack of clarity and the resulting conflicts of interpretation surrounding “the end of art” is that the term hasn’t yet been adequately placed within the larger contexts of Hegel’s system; in fact, his aesthetics is closely integrated with his work in logic and metaphysics, his ethical thought, his philosophy of religion and his theory of history.  The systematic location of the Lectures on Fine Art, and therefore of art’s dissolution, has never been fully explicated.  The lack of a more holistic approach to the theme of art’s dissolution has led to inaccurate accounts of that thesis, or at least resulted in creative misinterpretations.[1]  That in turn has blocked the development of a genuinely Hegelian treatment of contemporary art.  In order to grasp the full significance of Hegel’s aesthetics today, we need an understanding of how it fits into his philosophical system as a whole.  As it appears in the Lectures of the 1820’s, the theme of art’s dissolution is extraordinarily nuanced, both in its internal structure and through its multifarious connections to related themes in Hegel’s other writings.  The concept must be clarified through a close reading of the relevant passages within the wider context of Hegel’s philosophy as a whole: “any claim that philosophy displaces art must be understood in the context of Hegel’s entire philosophical system, and concentration simply on the Aesthetics is not sufficient for this purpose…art is produced within a larger hierarchical framework embracing law, the state, religion, and philosophy.”[2]  It’s only through a holistic and integrative reading of the relevant texts that Hegel’s philosophy of art becomes clear, and only on the basis of a more detailed and more systematic reading of art’s dissolution will it become possible to apply it to the art of the present.[3]

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[1]. Or, in Harold Bloom’s famous phrase, “productive misreadings;” see A Map of Misreading. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 75 and Kabbalah and Criticism. (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) p. 66.  See also “The Necessity of Misreading” in Georgia Review (Winter2001/Spring2002) Vol. 55/56, No. 4/1 pp. 69-86.  Not incidentally, Bloom referred to the current genre of the “poetry slam” as “the death of art.”  See “The Man in the Back Row Has a Question VI ” in The Paris Review (Spring, 2000) Vol. , No. 154 p. 379

[2]. Brian K. Etter Between Transcendence and Historicism: The Ethical Nature of the Arts in Hegelian Aesthetics (Buffalo, New York: SUNY, 2006) p. 71

[3]. For good examples of systematic approaches to Hegel’s Aesthetics, see Cornelia A. Tsakiridou, “Darstellung: Reflections on Art, Logic, and System in Hegel” The Owl of Minerva Vol. 23, No. 1 (Fall 1991) pp. 15-28; Gustav E. Mueller, “The Function of Aesthetics in Hegel’s Philosophy” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 5, No. 1. (September 1946), pp. 49-53; Richard Taft, “Art and Philosophy in the Early Development of Hegel’s System” in The Owl Of Minerva Vol.18, No. 2 (Spring 1987) pp. 145-162