Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Holism vs. Analysis in the Philosophy of Art History


There is an obvious sense in which Hegelian synthesis would be more suited to the study of art than philosophical analysis. Take any artwork; it’s a synthetic whole, and requires a holistic approach for proper understanding. A concept is holistic if it’s “used to refer to the forms of organization of a society [that] cannot be reduced without remainder to concepts which only refer to the thoughts and actions of specific individuals.”[1]  A style or milieu is holistic because you can’t make sense of it purely in terms of individual persons, although things like styles can only exist by being distributed among many individuals.  Elkins’ next step is to argue that if “art history is essentially ‘Hegelian,’ its positivist assumptions-that is, the objectivist intention and empiricist ‘position’…will be jeopardized” (Elkins, 1988:361).

It’s strange that Gombrich did not see the contradiction in his attack on “Hegelianism,” but that might be explained again by his theoretical (if not practical) commitment to positivist philosophy within the context of its time.  What Elkin’s treatment reveals is that features like holism, historicism and serial collectivism are essential to art historical practice as we know it, and that attempts to dispense with those theoretical habits, either by refusing theory altogether or by opting for a more empiricist approach, leads to something other than art history.[2]  For example, the attempt to make art history look like the natural sciences fails in just this way:  “Ackerman argued that art history, particularly in America, was becoming a hyperspecialized and increasingly fragmented pursuit of ‘facts’ and value-free ‘objectivity’…he linked the boom in specialization and the bust in speculation to a failure to communicate with the general public.”[3]  Of course, Ackerman’s comments could just as well be directed against analytic philosophy as it’s usually practiced.  For the attempt not to engage in theory inevitably leads to being unaware and uncritical of one’s own implicit theory.





[1]. Maurice Mandelbaum, “Societal Facts” in Theories of History Patrick Gardiner, ed. 1957 pp. 478-9; quoted in D. C. Phillips Holistic Thought in Social Science Stanford University Press, 1976 p. 40
[2]. The same could be said of sociology; see
[3]. Irving Lavin, “The Crisis of ‘Art History’” in The Art Bulletin Vol. 78, #1 March, 1996 p. 14  Lavin is quoting James Ackerman, “On American Scholarship in the Arts” in College Art Journal No. 17 1958 pp. 357-62

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