Friday, September 26, 2014

Dissolution, not End: Dialectic and Hegel's Philosophy of Art

Andy Warhol, “Brillo Box” (1964)
Synthetic polymer paint and silkscreen ink on wood, 17 1/8 x 17 x 14" (43.3 x 43.2 x 36.5 cm)
MOMA, New York City

The dissolution of art is fundamentally related to concept of dialectical sublation, which is “one of the most important notions in all of Hegel”[1] for art has, in fact, been sublated.  It is specifically with the irony of the Romantic period that art is supposed to have “come to an end” (in the sense indicated by Danto, for example); it has been cancelled and at the same time preserved, acting as the catalyst in the resolution of contradictory elements (reason and sensuality), and dissolving in the progress of that reaction.  Hence the connection between Auflösung is aufheben.  Hegel takes full advantage of the equivocal term Auflösung: literally, it  means “to raise up something; however, as a philosophical notion it can mean ‘cancel’, ‘dissolve’, or ‘preserve’, or all three at once!” (Carter, 1980:94).   Inwood says that the word “has three main senses:   (1) ‘to raise, to hold, lift up” (2) ‘to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend’ (3) ‘to keep, save, preserve’…Hegel regularly uses all three senses at once.”[2]  Similarly, Etter comments on “the difficulty of the German term aufheben, which may mean ‘to raise’, ‘to preserve’, or ‘to annul’-a profoundly plural ambiguity that Hegel exploits as the central explanatory term of his dialectical sense of history.”[3]  It’s worth quoting Hegel’s Logic at length to get a sense of exactly what he intends by the term, and to understand its central importance:

To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy.  It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from nothing.  What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing.  Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation; it is a non-being which has its origin in a being.  It still has, therefore, in itself the determinateness from which it originates.  “To sublate” has a twofold meaning in the [German] language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to.  Even “to preserve” includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it.  Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.[4]




[1]. Curtis L. Carter, “A Re-Examination of the ‘End of art” Interpretation of Hegel’s Aesthetics” in Art and Logic in Hegel’s Philosophy Warren E. Steinkraus; Kenneth L. Schmitz Humanities Press, 1980 p. 94
[2]. Michael Inwood A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1999) p. 283
[3]. Brian K. Etter Between Transcendence and Historicism: The Ethical Nature of the Arts in Hegelian Aesthetics (Buffalo: SUNY, 2006) p. 69
[4]. G. W. F. Hegel Science of Logic A.V. Miller, trans. (London and New York: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. And Humanities Press, 1969) pp. 106-7

No comments:

Post a Comment